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Abstract This article places the Brazilian Bolsonaro government in comparative perspective, par-
ticularly in what refers to the surge and strengthening of extreme-right globally. It dis-
cusses the emergence of a new sort of political regime (advanced liberal oligarchy) within a 
more general analysis of modern political regimes (in particular liberal democracy and its 
crisis, fascism and bureaucratic authoritarianism), the eruption of popular mobilization 
since 2013 in the country (as part of a global trend), the crisis of the left and how unexpec-
tedly an extreme-right political movement came to power in Brazil. The article then analy-
ses the Bolsonaro government in greater detail, its right-wing posture and its relation to 
liberal democracy and its largely oligarchic elements, as well as moves by the opposition.
Keywords Politics, Democracy, Oligarchy, Brazil. 
Resumo Este artigo põe o governo Bolsonaro no Brasil em perspectiva comparada, em particular 
no que se refere relançamento e fortalecimento da extrema-direita globalmente. Ele dis-
cute a emergência de um novo tipo de regime (a oligarquia liberal avançada) nos quadros 
de uma análise mais ampla dos regimes políticos modernos (em particular a democracia 
liberal e sua crise, o fascismo e o autoritarismo burocrático), da erupção da mobilização 
popular desde 2013 no país (como parte de uma tendência global), da crise da esquerda 
e de como de forma inesperada um movimento político de extrema-direita chegou ao 
poder no Brasil. O artigo então analisa o governo Bolsonaro em detalhe, sua postura de 
direita e relações com a democracia liberal e seus elementos em larga medida oligárqui-
cos, bem como dos movimentos da oposição.
Palavras Chave Politica, Democracia, Oligarquia, Brasil.
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Introduction It might be, to some considerable measure, correct, though it might sound somewhat 
false to say, that a spectre has been travelling around the world and that this is the spec-
tre of the extreme-right, in its diverse incarnations. It would not be entirely correct 
because there is another spectre spooking and enchanting modern society. This is the 
spectre of democracy. The former often pretends to be anti-elitist, which is actually a 
lie; the second is truly opposed, however confuse it may sometimes be, to the oligarchic 
elements of liberal democracy, which have been strengthened in the last decades.
My proposal in this paper is to consider these aspects in order to have a broader picture 
of what is happening across the world. Such analytical balance surely does not exhaust 
the contemporary political dynamic, neither geographically (since it does not engage 
with the remnants of “real socialism,” or authoritarian collectivism, indeed) nor, even 
where applicable, can it account for all features of political life. Yet I believe it captures 
a lot. I shall start where things empirically start: the oligarchic state of contemporary 
political systems, which do not in any case eliminate their democratic features. Those 
oligarchic aspects linked directly to social inequalities and economic power. This is true 
but does not properly frame the characteristics and situation of modern political sys-
tems in their specific imaginary and institutional moorings. I will try to reverse this by 
shifting emphases. Then I will tackle right-wing movements and parties, sweepingly, 
trying to bring out some of their common features. Many researchers have done this in 
greater empirical detail, so I can be briefer and more theory-oriented. I shall briefly con-
sider whether the present coronavirus sanitary crisis is harming these extreme-right 
currents. A subsequent section will deal directly with the Brazilian case.
Finally, I will turn to democratic movements that have spread out across the globe. Just 
too frequently have they been interpreted as reactions to “neoliberalism” and social in-
equality. Instead, I will deal with them as to a large, or larger extent, connected to a 
reaction to societal changes as well as to the state of political systems today, without 
detriment to issues related to neoliberalism, loss of rights and, more generally, the re-
traction of liberalism from its expansive moment, when democracy and a widening of 
rights took place. The interplay between right-wing currents, democratic dynamics and 
left-wing responses (or lack there of) will close my argument.
Democracy 
and oligarchy
For a long time, traditional classifications of political regimes were abandoned by po-
litical analysis. While democracy has featured steadily in discussions, autocracies are 
rarely mentioned, the same accruing to oligarchy. It is as though the former was the 
sort of political regime characteristic of modernity. All others (and they have been va-
ried) were only temporary fixes that would, in modernization theory style, up until now, 
eventually disappear. Dahl (1960) even preferred a more modest definition: poliarchy, 
in which the government of the many, but not exactly of every citizen, the demos, would 
be in point. Autocracies (the rule of the one) was also a transitory phenomenon, typical 
of Africa, communism, perhaps populism, with fascism constituting a peculiar regime, 
which was to a good extent a regression vis-à-vis modern democracy. Oligarchies, in 
turn, were merely those regimes which would, due to modernization, be superseded 
and succeeded by democracy, therefore wane for good once modernity is established. 
The only ones to keep an eye on things similar to oligarchy were “elite” theorists, yet 
they either assumed this was a universal phenomenon or reckoned it was intrinsic to 
democracy tout court, from which there would be no escape (Mosca, [1895] 1923; Pareto, 
[1916] 1923; Schumpeter, [1943] 1994).
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The fact is, however, that liberal (or “representative”) democracy is as such necessarily 
what the ancients (as well as Montesquieu and the American framers of the constitution) 
considered a mixed regime (a republic with representative government, as Mills would la-
ter put it, only partly a democracy, with the people always checked by an aristocracy of the 
spirit or the like). If on the one side there is popular participation and contestation, whe-
reas elections imply some level of popular sovereignty in liberal democracy, there is also 
oligarchy, since a closed and small circle of powerful people control the political process. 
Finally, it may also include some autocratic features, hence, while not monarchical, as 
usually in older, pre-modern regimes, it includes features of the rule of the one. Besides, 
there is no reason to think that liberal democracy is the regime that quintessentially cha-
racterises modernity. There are other possibilities, to which I shall return below, such as 
fascism, Bonapartism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, autocracy, as well as oligarchies, 
of which two variants may be identified: traditional liberal oligarchy and advanced libe-
ral oligarchy. For the latter, we may also sketch a partly dovetailed picture.
As stated above, liberal representative democracy has two aspects, even in the best of 
cases. This is inevitable insofar as there is a caesura between those down below and those 
up the top1. These tend to form close-knit groups, concerned with their own power, even -and 
often even more so, since this is their only source of power: the party or state machine- in 
the case of left-wing politicians. Even when those popular participatory elements, which 
can be radicalized indeed, are present, the “elitist” element persists, as an intrinsic part 
of the separation produced by the modern political system, even in relation to the orga-
nized parts of the societal political system (so-called civil society). This is especially true re-
garding the citizenry as a whole, taken as individualized and, to a large extent, atomized 
plebeians, in the political sense, which increasingly feel excluded from political processes 
and pit themselves against political oligarchies (Domingues, 2019a, 2019b).
At this point we need to take stock of an older discussion. Usually, oligarchies were un-
derstood as being characterized by the merger of state power and wealth (Aristotle, 1996). 
Some recent literature has emerged that recovers the concept of oligarchy in a similar 
vein (Winters, 2011). While this is to some extent true (and crystal-clear in countries such 
as Brazil and the United States) we need to acknowledge that in modernity there has 
been a differentiation of the political dimension from the rest of social life, likewise the 
economic (capitalist) dimension. This applies even in the relation between the political 
system in its state-based aspect with respect to the state overall. We therefore need to 
look at oligarchies in terms of their political power as such, not merely as an expression 
of plutocracy, that is, the domain of highly moneyed people. If banks, finance capital 
more broadly, have great influence upon politicians, these have their own career paths 
and power resources, operate in important sectors of the state, taking decisions that are 
usually not directly conditioned by economic interests, even though it is true that the ge-
neral economic dynamic may set limits to and spur politicians towards specific directions 
and choices (Offe, [1972] 1973). Yet this is not automatic. We should not exonerate poli-
ticians for their choices and political decisions as though they were basically powerless, 
as well as directly connected to or dependent upon capitalists (Streek, 2013). Nor should 
we think of them as if there was a specialized subsystem that has its own particular logic, 
from which there is no escape (Habermas, 1981; Luhmann, 2010), given that ethical and 
political choices are always available somehow. Bureaucrats also, as we see them in the 
European Union or in Peru, can hold a lot of power, regardless of what political systems 
strictly defined decide and do. In sum, there are variations in how oligarchic power in li-
beral democracies is organized, but in all cases political, as well as ethical, choices cannot 
be taken lightly, as if economic power or systemic logics explained political behaviour.
1 Even when its normative radi-
calization is suggested (as in Ur-
binati, 2014), the caesura does not 
disappear.
104RELASP Revista Euro Latinoamericana de Análisis Social y PolíticoAño 2,  Nº 3  - 2021
If liberal democracies are mixed in terms of how they fit into a classification of regimes, 
their democratic side can be more or less strong. There was, during the late nineteenth 
and most of the twentieth century, a democratizing trend within liberal democracy. The 
traditional oligarchic regime was left behind, with its restricted franchise, absolute con-
trol of the agenda by the old oligarchy (landed still, to a good extent), restricted state 
activity and denial of political and social rights for the majority (working-class people, 
women, blacks and minorities). There was therefore an expansive moment for libera-
lism and liberal democracy, in which also social rights came to the fore. At the end of 
the twentieth century, however, we witnessed the beginnings of an involution of liberal 
democracy, that is to say, a process of de-democratization. We have now possibly entered 
what I have called a new sort of regime, or are in train of getting there, unless demo-
cratic mobilizations pushed political life in another direction: advanced liberal oligarchy. 
This regime allows for some room for debate (contestation), we all can vote, the public 
agenda is supposedly up to grabs, but nothing of this seems to really matter. To be sure, 
some developments, from Turkey, through India, Hungary and Poland, to Brazil, let 
alone Russia, seem to suggest that such sort of regime can be tougher and much less 
liberal. Whereas western Europe and the United State possess a liberal framework and 
infrastructure that resists the encroachments of extreme-right forces, other areas and 
countries evince a weaker liberal background and may develop into a less liberal sort of 
oligarchy. We could thus say that we need a twofold classification of advanced liberal 
oligarchies, 1 and 2, the former more liberal, the latter, more repressive and less liberal, 
though overall vigilance and police repression are spreading across modern societies 
and mobilizing state devices.  Or rather, we should think of it as possibly a continuum 
within this sort of regime. It is important to stress that this is not a sort of state of ex-
ception within liberal democracy (Agamben, 2003) -an oxymoron if we suppose it is a 
permanent regime-, as too often we see argued, it is instead a new sort of political re-
gime. In practice, however, at least in Brazilian case this consists merely in theoretical 
hypothesis, since the traditional oligarchic sectors have shown how much control they 
exert over the political system, probably discarding that second possibility, which would 
please especially the present president, Jair Bolsonaro. A more consistent extreme-right 
turn seems to be temporary blocked, which does not mean that the regime cannot beco-
me more authoritarian.
In order to grasp how we have got there we need, however, to understand the disa-
ppointments of most people today as well as the role of such extreme-right forces in 
relation to democracy and often as protest movements.
The contemporary 
emergence of the 
extreme-right
There are many ways to look into the new movements and governments characterized 
by extreme-right features. Some views would simply affirm a continuity between twen-
tieth century fascism (and even Latin American and southern European military regi-
mes) and new movements and governments. This has not been however well-argued 
and what we do find is usually a more systematic refusal to simply accept a direct link 
between them, although there are obvious lines of continuity (Traverso, 2017). In any 
case, neither these movements nor regimes can be easily fit into the fascist model: nei-
ther is their mass basis the petty bourgeoisie, nor even the statist and economic nationa-
list character of fascism is there to be seen (Mann, 2004; Poulantzas, [1970] 1974; Paxton, 
2004). To be sure, nationalism, as against foreigners and especially against Muslins -and 
sometimes Jews-, comes up time and again in Europe, while a xenophobic atmosphere 
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can be found also in movements elsewhere, with the Muslim trope remaining promi-
nent. Neoliberalism is, on the other hand, present in several of such movements which 
can be, at times, concerned with the well-being of the working classes and the re-built 
of some sort of Welfare State that would care exclusively for “nationals” but reach out to 
those left out among them. There is no homogeneity in this respect.
Another way of looking at them is through the lens of populism (Diehl, 2001; Mudde, 
2010). The problem is that this is such an elusive definition that it is even difficult to take 
stock of, and even more apply it properly to, a specific case. There is so much variation in 
the concept and in the correspondence between it and reality that drawing upon any of 
its variants in my view simply just does not pay off. To be sure, demagoguery is a feature 
of extreme-right discourses, but this is not a characteristic that only belongs to them. 
At the same time, irrationalism, fake news, the lack of commitment to truth, some sort 
of putative Gramscian strategy to wage cultural wars as well as a damning good way to 
use the internet and social media have been distinguished features of such movements, 
which have enlisted a significant amount of militancy (Metz & Seelen, 2018; Taguief, 
2012; Boltanski & Esquerre, 2014; Nagle, 2017; Herman & Muldoon, 2019).
More promising seems to be the definition of the extreme-right of the present as a protest 
movement or, even more broadly, as a regressive sort of social movement, although some 
people may simply deeply believe in their values and proposals. Yet against neo-libera-
lism and social exclusion, with the shaming inequalities that do not stop to grow in the 
late decades across the planet, allegiance to such movements may stem from unders-
tandable grounds but in any case would be an inappropriate and reactionary answer 
to the feelings of abandonment experienced today by so many working-class people as 
well as by part of the middle-classes (Heitmeyer, 2018; Koppetsch, 2019). They are, ne-
vertheless, we can add, also a protest against the increasing oligarchization of political 
systems, the slow but relentless construction of advanced liberal oligarchy (in which 
parts of the upper middle classes and evidently the rich are doing very well). Feelings 
of vulnerability and powerlessness are then answered with the worse modern societies 
and human beings in general can produce: exclusivism, selfishness and prejudice, whe-
reby reembeddings of disembedded people -processes typical of modernity- assume defen-
sive and frequently horrendous features, landing them in right-wing identities and at 
least the occasional choice of reactionary, anti-egalitarian and anti-freedom politics2.
It is interesting to note that, like climate change, regarding which this extreme-rights 
currents have mostly adopted a sort of denial (Forchtner, 2019), the present sanitary 
crisis linked to the coronavirus and the related disease Covid-19 has elicited responses 
from these same groupings which either denied or minimized its threat. Some doubt 
whether this will damage them, but we can hypothesize that this is likely: as we will see, 
in Brazil this has been the case. While climate change is something more difficult to 
grasp and other explanations can be offered in opposition to anthropocentric action, 
allowing for some sort of flat-earth mentality, the coronavirus pandemic has an expli-
cit and immediately devastating death toll, which mixes in complex ways an ensuing 
economic crisis, yet cannot, in any case, be dismissed as something of no importance. 
Hence, the likely damage to extreme-right currents, especially in the Americas, for bad 
responses, or lack thereof, although they will certainly fight back (while it is true that in 
places like Poland and Hungary extreme-right governments have already made more 
and explicit anti-democratic moves) ( Burchard, Roberts, Moens & De La Baume, 2020; 
Mudde, 2020; Gerbaudo, 2020).
Of course, those extreme-right forces are neither democratic nor democratizing, pace 
their demagogic rhetoric: on the contrary, they can be agents that further the deepening 
2 We can speak here of deleterious 
and self-canceling dialectic of freedom.
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oligarchization of contemporary political systems and may also shield capitalists, big 
corporations and finance capital as well as the well-off. Note however that, as Trotsky 
([1932] 2007:19-20) realized in the 1930s, these movements have, at least to a large ex-
tent, a plebeian character (although people from the upper classes are surely involved), 
discursively posited against the rich and powerful, traditional party leadership and the 
like. Again, especially when in power, they do not necessarily pursue policies that favour 
working classes, the poor and plebeians.
Often, a highly personalistic sort of politics is played out by the extreme-right. Actua-
lly, personalization is a characteristic that pervades liberal political systems. Whereas 
liberal aspirations ideally evacuated modern political systems of the personal elements 
associated with the rule of the one (such as in European absolutism) in practice, some 
level of personalization, sometimes very high, never disappeared. Concreteness (which 
returns in the development of the modern political dimension) re-emerges with a ven-
geance also within political systems themselves, as we have known at least since Marx’s 
discussion of Bonapartism (Marx, [1852] 1960; Domingues, 2019b). Populism expresses 
this very directly (but then too much has to be brought into this vague concept, from 
Perón to Thatcher and beyond) (Germani, 1965; Hall, 1988). Not all extreme-right move-
ments count and/or bet on that, but a few do. All things considered, such movements 
have moreover not broken with liberal political systems, although they may attack some 
elements of the liberal infrastructure, including aspects of the law, and of liberal de-
mocracy, searching for legitimation on the basis of what Schmitt ([1928] 1993:204-220) 
defined as representation through direct identification, in a sort of plebiscitary mecha-
nism (which would not need to be specified). The closure of the political system, with a 
combination of the rule of the few and of the one, under the disguise of the rule of many, 
may be -and has been- established or reinforced, with money playing an important role 
in the tortuous (s)election of rulers by the ruled in some instances.
Finally, let me bring up Adorno’s ([1967] 2019) lecture on the spectre of right wing extre-
mist, a politically shrewd piece and unfortunately still valid today, although some adjust-
ments in his marxist framework are necessary. In a sense, we could look backwards and 
say that he had summed up what these those many analysts have disassembled today. 
Adorno notes, resuming Marx’s discussion of developmental trends (Tendenzen), that 
such currents stem from the concentration of capital and the relative impoverishment 
of several social layers and the foreseeable “catastrophic breakdown” (Zusammenbruch) 
of capitalism (the petty bourgeoisie included, but not only, in the 1960s likewise the past) 
as well as of the blockage of democracy, which remains purely formal. It means that 
people are threatened but have no options to overcome this predicament. The problem 
is that a sort of psychological, unconscious displacement comes about. Right extremism 
is based on propaganda -as the ultimate privileging of means in relation to ends, which 
would become empty and irrelevant-, as well as on stupid and simple, but exhaustively 
repeated ideas. These get hardened the more implausible they become (again, this im-
plausibility is repressed through some sort of not mentioned psychological mechanism). 
Right-wing extremism is demagogic and false in relation to democracy, which it hates, 
alongside intellectuals and reason, Jews and whatever escapes the nation-state, some-
thing that could not work already by then and, exactly because of that, becomes feti-
shized (though I must stress that Adorno did not at all grasp the emancipatory push of 
nationalism in the periphery). Communists, which were not such a strong possibility 
in the 1920s-1930s in Germany and by the time he gave his lecture meant nothing in the 
Federal Republic in the 1960s, were also a sort of a scapegoat for such twisted perspec-
tives. Such ideology contains elements of truth, which become false due to their entan-
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glement with absurdities. While the breakdown of capitalism is unlikely to come about, 
at least the way Adorno seems to suggest, there is little in his statements that would not 
apply to contemporary societies, especially the malaise and personal insecurity that be-
devils almost every single soul today.
Can we speak, beyond authoritarian inclinations, and sometimes assaults against the 
liberal institutional framework, of a new sort of regime? I doubt that: it is rather a disgui-
sed form of advanced oligarchy that has come into play, whether rather undemocratic libe-
ral or tendentially illiberal, as some may argue (Mounk, 2018). In other words, while the 
extreme-right may have to grapple with more deeply entrenched liberal systems, it may 
find room for less liberal strategies, which they are keen to further in an authoritarian 
way, beyond the imaginary and discourse, hence changing institutional elements of the 
state and the law, as well as influencing society at large. When and whether we cannot 
speak of even advanced liberal oligarchies is an open question, to start with Russia since 
the 1990s, where liberal democracy has never set roots, even though we can hardly point 
to a dictatorial regime there, despite the role of vigilance and repression, as well as of 
personalization and strong autocratic features.
In Latin America, where, in spite of the democratic push of the 1980s-2000s, oligarchic 
features of political systems, often strongly coupled with widespread state neopatrimo-
nial elements, stand out, the problem is not different, even when left-wing forces have 
come to power (and have tried to perpetuate themselves there, with recourse also to 
a radical personalization of politics). This does not mean that there are no opposing 
tendencies and trends at work. But especially in the case of Brazil a fierce right-wing 
government has come to the helm of the state. This has understandably awakened fears 
of a return to the not very distant past. Let us examine which past this is and what are 
the conditions of the country today, in order to assess which are the developmental pos-
sibilities in the political dimension.
The Brazil of 
Bolsonaro
The election of Jair Bolsonaro, a low level and extreme-right legislator, a fan of the mili-
tary dictatorship, openly fascist, misogynist, racist and anti-communist, in the middle 
of a prolonged crisis of the Brazilian political system and society, has come as a shock to 
those that until very close to the end of the first round of the presidential election found 
it basically impossible to happen. His personal loose ideology and the amalgam derived 
from his alliances are a mix of the old right-wing, anti-communist perspectives of the 
military dictatorship he so much admires, the new global extreme-right irrationalism 
and the evangelical conservatism that made such powerful inroads in Brazilian society 
in the last decades, with its traditional family and heteronormative values, combined 
with a lar and order agenda and the adoption of social and economic neoliberal poli-
cies. Because of the radicalism of his discourse and its very sectional appeal, it seemed 
unlikely that he could win the elections, actually until the last months of the campaign. 
Many, like myself, thought the oligarchic groups that control the political system would 
be capable of holding the levers of power due to the reforms that strengthened their 
hands with lots of state money (once the Supreme Federal Tribunal -STF- prohibited 
private company money was used in electoral campaigns) and television time for elec-
toral propaganda. The disgust of the Brazilian population against politicians found its 
way into the up to then unlikely victory of Bolsonaro, whose occasional party of choice 
(the Social Liberal Party -PSL-) was basically inexistence until that moment.
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Bolsonaro drew upon the usual receipt of right-wing forces across the globe as of late-
ly: intensive use of social media (illegally to a large extent, with lots of robots outside 
the country) and fake news, with a discourse very much against the left and the Wor-
kers’ Party (PT), as well as the support of the US extreme-right (including Steve Bannon) 
(Solano Gallego, 2019). Lower-rank officers in the armed forces pushed their superiors 
towards Bolsonaro and he enjoyed concentrated evangelical support, while voting across 
classes, with a predominance of the well-off and in the South and Southeast, guaranteed 
his electoral majority. Yet, to reduce Bolsonaro’s victory to his communication strategy 
or to a supposed anti-poor bias, and above all to the use of fake news, as the PT oligarchic 
ruling group does, including seemingly Lula da Silva, is really disingenuous. It entirely 
misses the point and opens room for subsequent defeats in the years to come.
The crisis of the political system started in 2013, when massive demonstrations, which 
brought together, implying also conflicts, people of all political persuasions, while too 
many social demands went on unmet after more than a decade of centre-left governments. 
It expanded relentlessly afterwards (Domingues, 2015 and 2017; Carvalho, 2018). The re-
velation of far-reaching corruption schemes by the most important political forces, from 
the centre-right, centre and centre-left then wrought havoc, with the judiciary -through 
the Car-Wash operation- performing in a sort of bonapartist way. Prosecutors and judges 
took advantage of and contributed to the deepening political crisis and the in-fighting of 
the political oligarchies, traditional and new alike (the PT’s machine had by this time taken 
an entrenched taste for power, its props and perks), which were at each other’s throat in 
a factional way typical of oligarchic political systems. Meanwhile the economic crisis that 
gained traction in 2015, especially after Dilma Rousseff be trayed her electoral promises 
and adopted recessive policies, which, along with the desperation of politicians for so-
meone that would help them get off the hook, led to her impeachment, on (at best) very 
dubious legal premises and partly in a revengeful mood. Her impeachment represented a 
parliamentary coup by congresspeople in search of self-protection against the advances of 
the Car Wash (Lava-Jato) judiciary operations against corruption. It was eventually suppor-
ted by business, which already wanted the implementation of a radical neoliberal agenda 
(Domingues, 2017).
Lula da Silva, the former president, who had become the fiduciary authority of the po-
litical system, with its corrupted schemes, simultaneously with being the most popular 
politician in the country among the poor, was jailed (though it is doubtful whether he 
would be capable of getting elected as his supporters claim). In turn, the Party of the 
Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), for two decades already a neoliberal, faintly so-
cial liberal centre-right formation, was even more profoundly affected by the corrup-
tion scandals than even the in practice more social liberal PT, its main contender from 
the 1990s to the mid-2010s. Finally, the centrist and extremely patrimonialist Party of 
the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), to which the vicepresident Michel Te-
mer belonged, and who took over after Rousseff’s fall and is now being prosecuted- was 
overwhelmed, alongside similar parties to the centre and centre-right of the political 
spectrum, by the same succession of corruption scandals. This was the window that 
allowed for Bolsonaro’s victory, after he was unexpectedly stabbed by a crazy man with 
a left-wing background.
It is necessary here to pause for a moment to reconsider and elaborate on the notion of 
political system adumbrated above (see, again, Domingues, 2019a & 2019b). It has two 
sides, a state-based and societal one. While the mediation between the population and 
the state political system, through in part the societal political system, is surely very im-
portant, their own internal dynamics, especially that of the state political system, must 
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be accounted for. Therein lies, to a large extent, the oligarchic character of the system, 
which frequently blocks off even the participation of those who take part in the societal 
political system, let alone the population as a whole. This is what underwent such a deep 
crisis. Formerly the armed forces played Pretorian roles, in Latin America as elsewhere 
in the world (Marx, [1852] 1960 & Huntington [1968] 2006, 4, 47–50, 79), but now the judi-
ciary partly assumed this role, inspired also by the Italian Mani Pulite operation, further 
propelling the crisis of the political system of which it had in the first place taken advan-
tage to push through its anti-corruption agenda. Many have attempted to explain the 
downfall of Rousseff and the judiciary procedures that led Lula da Silva to prison men-
tioning supposed conspiracies by US imperialism, the desire to take over the Brazilian 
pre-Sal oil and similar things, as well as the putative hatred of the rich and particularly 
the middle classes of the poor. Although, however, they have been especially tough with 
the PT and the upper-echelons of the judiciary have clearly been protecting centre-right 
politicians (but also, when possible, PT’s Congressmen and women), it is patently the 
impossibility of keeping the usual workings of the political system, in the face of multi-
faceted and pervasive popular dissatisfaction, that has led to the disorganization of the 
system. If Bolsonaro was never an outsider, his subaltern position within the political 
system lent credibility to his claim of not being part of it, alongside his clearly plebeian 
background and carefully crafted discourse. This was just a natural successor to Lula’s 
poor man’s personal outlook and public demeanour. His share of the electorate in 2018 
largely demonstrates this, with a powerful show in the periphery of the big cities, where 
the Evangelical churches are extremely strong, although he was initially less popular 
in the northeast and with blacks and women and in the southeast, with his supporters 
showing some less commitment to democracy (Tavares de Almeida & Guarnieri, 2020; 
Cardoso, 2020; Nicolau, 2020). 
As pointed out, personally Bolsonaro could be easily deemed a fascist, Brazilian style, 
with solid connections with the most right-wing elements (the “mad dogs”, so to speak) 
of the military dictatorship, torturers and others of their ilk. Therefore, the state and 
the armed forces (usually almost nothing of a fascist movement) play a key role in this 
perspective. Moreover, he and his politically active sons -fundamental in his broader 
movement at present- entertain close links with the global right but also with the cri-
minal militias that plague Rio de Janeiro. These are made above all of policemen (thou-
gh firemen play a part in it too) who exploit, prostitution, gambling, illegal cable TV, 
gas, drugs and many other activities, including the killing of “unwanted” elements and 
of their “enemies” (drug dealers particularly, whose territory they want to take over). 
Among the former, for still obscure reasons, we find the murdered councilwoman Ma-
rielle Franco. Yet Bolsonaro’s government is not a fascist one, though he would surely 
like to get rid of the democratic features of Brazilian liberal democracy and introduce 
a sort of revised authoritarian regime, with open autocratic features. Let us look a bit 
more closely into that.
The 1960s-1980s were characterized in Brazil, as much as in other South Cone coun-
tries of the La tin America, by what O’Donnell (1973, 1982) defined as an authoritarian 
bureau cratic regime at the centre of which was the army, though businessmen had a 
crucial role in it too. We can say it had fascist features (especially regarding the role 
of the political police), but it was mainly the bureaucratic structure of the armed for-
ces that served as its organizational pillar, while anti-communism lied at the core of 
its ideology. Is there a possibility of Brazil returning to such a regime? I think this is 
very unlikely. What is possible -though the present general crisis makes it less likely or 
sustainable- is the development of what I have defined as advanced liberal oligarchy 
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2: most of the explicit elements of the liberal infrastructure remain in place, elections 
are held, public debate may be more or less open, but repression, surveillance, some 
censorship and more generally authoritarianism unfold, supported by extreme-right 
activity in social media, alongside neoliberal reforms, which are demanded especially by 
finance capital but also by the upper classes in general, including the liberal press and 
liberal politicians (like Rodrigo Maia, of Democrats -DEM-, a centre-right party, who 
was during the years 2019-2020 president of chamber of deputies and played an absolu-
tely instrumental part in passing many key reforms, though he also opposes Bolsonaro’s 
more authoritarian moves).
Right now, Brazil does not have a completely extreme-right government, Bolsonaro’s 
moves have been blocked, but if consolidated he may turn it into that, strengthening 
the most oligarchic and repressive features of advanced liberal oligarchy. Actually, this 
looks much more like the frustrated project of self-reformation of the military regime in 
the 1980s, before its defeat, than like a return to the past. We must add to this the even 
more extreme conservatism, in terms of mores, of evangelical (especially Pentecostal) 
churches in Brazil (likewise in the US) and the irrationalism of putative intellectuals 
(such as the bizarre Olavo de Carvalho) who got to the point of embracing the flat earth 
trope (though surely the smartest of them play a game using this with others who are 
truly the fools). Very central for the government (mirroring the Philippines) is also the 
law-and-order approach (generally and in particular vis-à-vis corruption, despite serious 
inconsistencies when it comes to Bolsonaro’s sons and the government) of which Jus-
tice Minister Sérgio Moro, the popular Car Wash judge, is the main expression. Tough 
on crim e and soft with guns and violence against criminals: this is a widespread pers-
pective in Brazil today, including among the poor, who seem to be tired of criminality. 
Note in particular that order and state legitimacy are very dear to the military (a topic in 
which Rosenfield (2018) is an argumentative right-wing exponent) with the Bolsonaro 
government purportedly standing up for them.
Besides, in order for Brazil to jump into a regime change oriented towards a bureau-
cratic authoritarian, let alone a fascist regime stout social support would be needed as 
well as that of the army. This does not exist, as it became clear in the course of 2020, 
though he has, with a military crisis in May 2021, advanced over its command, which he 
substituted. It is true that there is now an open and vociferous extreme-right in Brazil. 
Also true is Bolsonaro’s support by around 30 percent of the electorate (always polari-
zing the political process and working hard to keep this level of backing) and that the 
armed forces maintain now a strong dislike of the left. At the same time, until at least 
the beginning of 2020, Bolsonaro tried to rule by sowing chaos, through provocations 
and a permanent sort of campaign, in order to keep his amount of support firm, though 
it is also clear that as to governing he has a much more destructive plan in mind (No-
bre, 2019). This is however as yet not the same as a clear support for regime change, a 
so-called self-coup. Business, which largely upheld Bolsonaro and carries on upholding 
his economic agenda, is likewise unlike to back such sort of adventure. This is bound 
to end up badly and, in any case, would be very costly, especially at the global level, for 
the country. Actually, there seems to be no reason for such a disruptive move. Besides, 
now controlled by the centre-right, Congress is doing a good job in what regards further 
neoliberal reforms.
In sum, if politics has its own dynamic and must be analyzed in partial independence 
from other social processes, concretely this is only relative, though it must never be trea-
ted as a dependent variable. Bear in mind furthermore that, although this is a neoliberal 
government in many respects, Bolsonaro had never been associated to this credo. He 
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can change his tack and, if in particular labour law and retirement schemes have beco-
me much worse for workers, social liberalism, as we can see with recent developments 
of the Bolsa Familia cash transfer scheme, remains in place and might even turn to be 
more encompassing in order to propel his popularity and try to erase the left3.
All this said, it was clear that in the beginning of 2020 Bolsonaro was not doing bad. His 
strategy of polarization seemed to work and, although the economy did not take off, it 
was not as bad. Bolsonaro was then hit by the coronavirus crisis, with its attendant heal-
th and economic implications (see Domingues, 2021). He fought against social distancing, 
defended by his health minister and all governors in the country. He dragged his feet 
until accepting the need to hand out cash to informal workers and workers unemployed 
or with partial salary reduction as well as to business, while his extremely neoliberal 
minister (Paulo Guedes) tried to deny the depth of impending crisis. Denial of science, a 
concern with an economic recession which might (two years later, in 2022) prevent his 
re-election and an imitation of Donald Trump’s initial negative response to coronavirus 
guided Bolsonaro to a deadlock from which he decided not to try to escape. Losing po-
pularity, he fired the minister while of health and, because the investigation of his sons 
by the Federal Police, Moro clashed with him over the forced change of its head, leading 
to a further fall of rates of approval (although Moro himself has dodged the recognition 
of the crimes committed by Bolsonaro and his sons). While a typical extreme-right pers-
pective on science came to the fore in his positioning, a crude and callous sort of not 
only economic but also biological Darwinism (the weak die and life carries on) surfaced 
too, along with a shallow military mentality (in all wars there are casualties).
Talk of impeachment has become widespread and it has indeed for the first time a real 
possibility. Instead of searching for accommodation, Bolsonaro has however more 
openly attacked Congress and the STF, radicalizing political conflict. At the same time, 
he decided to strike a deal with the centrão (the big centre) in Congress, a usually corrupt 
group of politicians, who have been regularly involved in brutal scandals, while his eco-
nomy minister resists the emergency Keynesianism the crisis has globally elicited. The 
political crisis is certain to keep developing and mounting. It has become harder for Bol-
sonaro to finish his government, whereas fascist groups have been organizing in society 
and it is not totally clear whether the armed forces, always evoked by Bolsonaro, would 
support him if push comes to shove, though they would more likely remain neutral.
But Bolsonaro blinked earlier than the others. Due to the reaction of the armed for-
ces, making it clear that they would not be involved in his defence, the pressure of the 
dominant oligarchies, the international rejection, the loss of popularity, the threat of 
investigations of his sons, the possibility of his presidential ticket being invalidated in 
the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Bolsonaro gave in. Faced with impeachment or the 
invalidation of his mandate due to the massive use of fake news on WhatsApp and the 
like, he was forced to adapt to traditional liberal oligarchy schemes, albeit unwillingly. 
He then got rid of more problematic ministers, changed some strategic policies (espe-
cially in relation to the Amazon region), accepted to see his most strident supporters 
being arrested and set aside his provocations. Finally, the liberal oligarchic system in 
its most traditional sense ( advanced liberal oligarchy 1) therefore prevailed. If Bolso-
naro resumes his former strength and is elected for a second term, we can return to 
the possi bility of seeing a more authoritarian and repressive model (advanced liberal 
oligarchy 2) re-emerge, especially since his popularity has somewhat, though unstably, 
improved. For the time being this seems at least on hold. Developments are in any case 
still open, despite the ongoing strengthening of its information system. Bolsonaro focu-
ses on the establishment larger cash transfer programme, which replaces the emergen-
3 Recall that the equity (actually 
anti-egalitarian) logic of such pro-
grammes was actually inaugurat-
ed by Pinochet’s dictatorship (Ro-
dríguez, 2016).
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cy aid and the Bolsa Família itself, though his desired Renda Brasil programme did not 
move forward, as well as surreptitiously on a public works programme that breaches the 
infamous spending ceiling, introduced during Temer’s presidency, which guarantees 
taxation and the rentist extraction of resources. He aims to boost his re-election the-
reby. Very clearly, a competition for the vote of the “poor” has been established, which 
engages the whole political spectre, regardless of ideological colours. They were seemin-
gly abandoned, but, due to the difficult situation of the country in the next few years, it 
is unlikely they will not return.
Bolsonaro’s popularity has wavered, as it did in the first months of 2020 due to the 
worse ning of the sanitary and economic situation, without emergency cash for a few 
months. This does not mean that he is no longer a main competitor in the 2022 elec-
tions, especially since the emergency cash has now returned and the pandemic is most 
likely to be under control and economic growth return in 2022. Moreover, if Bolsona-
ro loses these elections he will surely denounce an inexistent fraud and will not leave 
power peacefully.
This leads us to a discussion of what we can expect of the democratic opposition, inclu-
ding the role of a social agenda. We need in addition to go further and inquire into the 
other social and political elements that have been fast developing in Brazilian society 
and may lead to a renewal of democracy and democratic thinking.
Democracy, 
opposition and the 
future of Brazil 
(and of the world)
Opposition to Bolsonaro had thus far been largely ineffective. He seemed to become 
stronger and stronger. This has not yet been discarded, but if it occurs it will be in ano-
ther register.
Students and university professors took to the streets in 2019 and conservative liberals 
(many of whom supported Bolsonaro in the second round of the 2018 elections) resisted 
his advances, along with the press with a similar doctrinal angle, blocking some of his 
excesses, while the latter have also supported his neoliberal reforms. The left has coura-
geous parliamentarians, who have played an important role in denouncing and articula-
ting resistance against Bolsonaro. But unions and similar left movements are paralyzed. 
The very strategy of democratic forces and, especially, of the left against the degradation 
of liberal democracy in Brazil has not been consensual. Some have argued for a demo-
cratic front against Bolsonaro’s “fascist” or at least “authoritarian” plans. Others prefer 
to bet on a narrower left front. Finally, especially since he left prison, Lula da Silva and 
most of the PT have emphasized their usual choice: to be the absolute protagonists of 
politics in general and, particularly, of electoral processes, as if nothing new was happe-
ning in Brazil and in the world. The centre, for its part, was seriously injured in the 2018 
elections and is still in its initial efforts to reorganize itself. It is gradually re-emerging.
The main issue for the left, despite Bolsonaro’s thus far changed position, remains the 
same: how to assemble a democratic front against the extreme-right, although the left 
is unlikely to profit from it in the short or even the medium-run. At this point Brazil su-
ffers under a mix of extreme-right government and oligarchic politics. While, therefore, 
keeping the democratic front is crucial for left politics, at the same time a more radical 
democratic and socially-oriented programme must also be put forward by the left, in 
itself plural, so that it keeps its identity and has its proper agenda in this case against the 
liberal opposition, which in this regard often sides with Bolsonaro. Overlapping systems 
of alliance are required in this regard, although the Left is rather lost and practically 
blocked, as well as very divided.
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Other processes have been however developing, which most politicians and even inte-
llectuals have enormous difficulty to grasp. To some extent in Latin America, it star-
ted in 2001 in Argentina with its que se vayan todos, but its landmark was the 2013 de-
monstrations, a true explosion, in Brazil (Domingues, 2015). Since then, eruptions of 
citizens dissatisfied and disgusted with the political system have been regular across 
the subcontinent, likewise other regions of the globe. This includes those in which the 
target may be the left, as in Bolivia, with the disrespect for the Constitution showed by 
Evo Morales and his party and subsequent straightforward electoral fraud, or in Chile, 
against the whole political system, both in 2019. Usually, people want to read a rejection 
pure and simple of neoliberalism in such demonstrations and insurrections, something 
maybe truer in some cases, for instance in Ecuador, also in 2019 and partly obviously in 
the Chilean case (but as well in 2013 Brazil vis-à-vis the weak social liberal reformism of 
Lula da Silva and Rousseff).
Yet the main and direct target has been the oligarchic character of state political systems 
(that may extend into the societal political system in particular if left parties colonize 
it through prebendal offers and interventionist moves to secure control and support) 
and the exclusion of citizens from political processes as well as from the often-sump-
tuous settings and workings of the system. Social autonomization of agents, with the 
disappearance or weakening of the mediating forces that were paradoxically linked to 
democratization, though they were themselves rather oligarchic (such as unions and 
other movements), has led to this transformed situation (Domingues, 2019a). There is 
no way back from it. Individualized mass social media has been also playing a key part 
in the furthering of this social fluidity and new forms of mobilization.
This sort of mass mobilization may re-emerge in Brazil at any moment, although it looks 
unlikely at this precise point, especially since an increasingly extreme-right government 
furnishes the focus of political struggle. In the long run, this is a plebeian promise of 
democratization, regardless of whether such moves are capable of breaking through the 
armature of the political system, something which the 2013 explosions failed to achieve. 
It is not a matter of absolutizing it, since without parties and the like it is impossible to 
operate especially in the state political system. It is important however to democratize 
these parties, still in the course of the resistance against the extreme-right, such as is the 
case in Brazil today. Besides, innovative programmes relating to climate change, radical 
changes in capitalism and labour, social welfare, etc. are necessary, beyond conventional 
policies and politics, re-engaging workers and plebeians overall, the youth and women 
(Domingues, 2020). We have a long way ahead in order to be able to respond to these 
needs adequately. This may discourage many, but may also be seen as an opportunity 
for creative politics, in which resuming and deepening democracy must have priority, 
starting with a broad democratic front against the extreme-right, whether or not we 
believe it may establish a “fascist” government or “simply” a very repressive and contro-
lling new sort of oligarchic regime. This exceeds the Brazilian situation, surely, consis-
ting in a global issue, but assumes, in the face of recent political developments, specific 
features there. We need to be attentive to both. Besides, the next years are bound to be 
marked by a deep, economic and social as well as possibly political, crisis, with perhaps 
unforeseeable consequences.
With Lula’s absolutely likely candidacy, after his trials were annulled in the STF in 
March 2021, the scenario obviously changes. He, who has always refused a politics of 
democratic front, could supposedly individually defeat Bolsonaro in 2022. Once again, 
Lula and the PT most probably manage to impose themselves hegemonically on its po-
litical spectrum, and maybe even stall movements of renewal and change within the 
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left and the centre-left. But it would be false to assume that, as he and his supporters 
apparently would like to believe, a return to 2002 is possible. This judicial change was 
pushed by STF’s Justice Gilmar Mendes (who had juridically vetoed Lula’s participation 
in the Rousseff’s government and clearly operates for the centre-right oligarchic sec-
tors). He has now declared Moro’s suspicion in Lula’s case after the revelation, by the 
site Intercept, of inadequate conversations between the judge and the public prosecu-
tors, with however a preemptive move by Justice Edson Fachin, who is more sympathe-
tic towards the Lava-Jato operation and had annulled Moro’s ruling through a mere a 
change of jurisdiction (without cancelling former criminal procedures). What the fi-
nal juridical consequences will be and what Mendes’ annulment means to the judiciary 
and the political system will be gradually revealed. In any case, a new conjuncture has 
opened, although Bolsonaro should not by no means be underestimated. Bolsonaro has 
moreover bent the army to his will, preventing his former health Minister, active army 
General Eduardo Pazuello, from being punished for taking part, with him, in a political 
demonstration. On the other had the Congress Inquiry Commission (CPI) installed to 
investigate the management of the pandemic has shown, if that was really needed, how 
reckless Bolsonaro and his government have behaved, whether or not this will have fur-
ther legal and political consequences.
Let me finish resuming Adorno’s ([1967] 2019:54-55) lecture. Pretending to be smart or 
lying like right extremists do (whether they are true fascists or not) cannot, he argued, 
an adequate answer: instead, it is with the resounding power of reason, with its non-ideologi-
cal truth, that the answer to the irrationalism and violence the extreme-right constantly 
mobilize should be given. It is false to ask about the future of right extremism, the extre-
me-right as I have named it here, as if it were a natural catastrophe, as nothing could do 
be done and resignation in the face of it was the only thing left. How it will develop and 
the responsibility for this depends on the social forces mobilized against it. The same 
applies however to the unprecedented social crisis Brazil will undergo in the next years 
and to the answers that shall be given to it.
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